The agricultural negotiations: an overflowing agenda; commentary by Bruce Gardner




im Josling’s paper is lucid, accurate, compre-
hensive, and sensible.  I have a few comments
on details, but I would like to focus more on issues
that follow up the ones he covered in his paper, par-
ticularly about the economic consequences of a
new agreement.  What difference will it make?  Of
course, it is premature to pretend to answer this
question about the Millennium Round in any but
the broadest strokes.  We might hope, however, to
have some evidence about the effects of the Uruguay
Round Agriculture Agreement (URAA).  But, the
Tangermann papers that Josling cites, as well as oth-
ers, have said that changes resulting from the
URAA in its ﬁrst years are too modest to have
expected substantial observable effects.
This is not to deny that the URAA is a consider-
able achievement.  It lays the foundation for signif-
icant liberalization of agricultural trade and, pos-
sibly as important, places an obstacle in the way of
increases in agricultural protection around the
world that might otherwise result in further trade
restrictions.  (I am taking it for granted that trade
liberalization in agriculture is a desirable end for
the same reasons that trade liberalization, in
general, is desirable; namely, it permits a larger
worldwide real income to be obtained from the
resources available.  In the case of U.S. agriculture,
there is a gain to the nation as a whole that also is
a gain to farmers, since the United States is a net
agricultural exporter and higher world-commodity
prices under liberalized trade will beneﬁt producers
more than it will cost consumers.  Therefore, when
arguing for liberalized trade in agriculture, one does
not have to rest one’s arguments on the gains to
consumers, who are hard to engage.  Unfortunately,
because the United States imports some farm prod-
ucts that we also produce [sugar, dairy products,
winter fruits, and vegetables] there are farmers
who stand to lose from liberalized trade, and they
tend to be more sensitive to their potential losses
than are the larger number of farmers who gain to
their potential gains.)
The URAA was signiﬁcant for several reasons. It:
(1) Established a framework in which commit-
ments were made to discipline agricultural
policies that distort trade;
(2) Required countries to quantify a baseline in
each disciplined area from which reductions
are to be made at an agreed-upon rate;  and
(3) Encouraged broader domestic policy reforms
that would ﬁt with URAA requirements.
However, almost every country was able to set
its baseline levels high enough for almost every
commodity so that reductions would have little or
no effect for several years after the agreement came
into effect on January 1, 1995.  In this respect, contin-
uation of reductions in the Millennium Round is the
key thing to negotiate; and it means the negotiations will
be really difﬁcult.  Nonetheless, increased imports have
been created because of minimum access commit-
ments, and the European Union and the United States
have both begun to implement some policy reforms.
In the U.S. case, the Federal Agriculture Improvement
and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 replaced deﬁciency
payments and supply manage-ment for grains and
cotton by a seven-year schedule of ﬁxed payments.
(During 1998 and 1999, however, the payments were
modiﬁed, and it is now practically certain that out-
lays for those payments will be larger than outlays
would have been under the pre-1996 programs.)
Figure 1 shows the recent history of world produc-
tion and trade in cereals (wheat, rice, corn, barley, oats,
sorghum, rye, and other grains).   Trade is increasing
slightly, but no more than the worldwide increase 
in production, as one can see in the chart showing
that the share of world production in international
trade is constant over the last two decades.1 Thus,
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1 Note that there is some ambiguity in what constitutes agricultural trade—
should food aid be counted, how much processing—do we count cookies
(no), sausages (yes), farmed ﬁsh (no), margarine (yes), wine (yes), rub-
ber (yes), silk (yes), cotton textiles (no)—and what about trade between
countries of a customs union?  In the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) statistics on agricultural trade, which U.S. data mostly use, food aid
is counted as trade, the commodity questions are answered as above, and
trade between members of all the main free-trade areas is counted.  Since
1992, FAO counts transactions among most former Soviet republics as
international trade, whereas before these were all domestic transactions.
Since 1993, trade between Slovakia and the Czech Republic is interna-
tional.  Similarly complicated, but quantitatively trivial changes, have
been made for the former Yugoslavia.REVIEW
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there is no evidence here that 1995 marks any kind
of departure in trend.
Figure 2 show trends in U.S. grain exports.
Grain is important in the U.S. view of the URAA
because we (I say “we” because I worked at the
Department of Agriculture [USDA] between 1989-
92 and was involved in the discussion)2 wanted
above all to achieve something concrete that farmers
could immediately see as beneﬁcial to them.  By
far the best candidate for such an achievement was
an agreement that would require the European
Community to reduce its export subsidies immedi-
ately.  In fact, the U.S. proposals, even after being
scaled back, would have accomplished this.  More
importantly, so would the compromises ﬂoated by
the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)
facilitators in Geneva, who, during and after December
1990, were impressively active and creative.  The
threat of immediate constraints upon European
Community scope for action, however, is precisely
why it took four more years to reach the Blair House
agreement, which ultimately found a time and manner
of implementation that would not lead to substan-
tial immediate constraints upon the European Com-
munity.  Also, as Figure 2 shows, it is hard to see any
favorable effect on U.S. grain exports after 1995,
although year-to-year variability makes changes in
trend tricky to detect.
Figure 3 expands the U.S. picture to consider
all agricultural trade.  Such immediate effects as the
URAA had appeared to be mainly minimum access
requirements usually implemented through the
tariff rate quotas that Tim’s paper discusses, which
should have helped U.S. rice producers in particular.
Figure 4 could be read optimistically to see an effect
in higher rice exports after 1995, but Figure 3 can-
not.  It seems more plausible that agricultural im-
ports were increased after 1995, but this is likely a
continuation of the import demand effects of con-
tinuing recovery from the recession of 1990.  One
detail may bother you.  Why does the value of agri-
cultural exports in aggregate decline during the last
three years, while the volume of grain exports in
Figure 2 rise?  The culprit is the large decline in
commodity prices that has occurred, which also
triggered large supplements to the previously-
thought-to-have-been ﬁxed payment to farmers
during 1998 and 1999.
The absence of concrete results so far is a factor
behind the reduced enthusiasm of farm groups for
the Millennium Round as compared to the Uruguay
Round—and there were lots of nay-sayers about the
Uruguay Round, too.  For a survey of the state of
opinion around the country, see the transcripts of
the USDA and United States Trade Representative
“listening sessions” held in 1999—transcripts on
Figure 1





























































SOURCE:  World Bank and USDA
NOTE:  Grain includes wheat, feed grains, and rice.
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NOTE:  Grain includes wheat, feed grains, and rice.
2 “Discussion” is used rather than “negotiation” because there was so
little negotiation in the sense of bargaining sessions between coun-
tries.  As the December 1990 Brussels meeting approached, at which
the Uruguay Round was to be concluded, one of the favorite sayings
of the chief United States Trade Representative (USTR) agricultural
negotiator, Julius Katz, was that it was hard to be optimistic about
reaching an agreement when after four years of the Round (after the
Ponte del Este kickoff in1986) there had not yet been a single day of
actual negotiating.  Still, there were endless days of discussion within
each country or group, i.e., negotiating with ourselves.the website of the Foreign Agriculture Service 
of USDA <http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/wto>.
Nonetheless, it remains the case that exports have
been an important source of real income gains for
farmers, and it is hard to imagine a worse threat to
the continued growth of farm incomes than stagna-
tion of export growth.
I conclude with a point of detail in the Josling
paper, which is, nonetheless, an important detail.
He refers to “slow but fundamental” changes in agri-
cultural policies in industrial countries.  In 1993, it
looked that way in the United States when Congress
passed, and President Clinton signed into law, an
end to the Wool Act, which had supported wool
and mohair producers since 1954.  It looked even
more so in 1996 when the Agricultural Market
Transition Act (“Freedom to Farm”) ended deﬁciency
payments that made up the difference between a
legislated target price and the market price of grains
and cotton, and removed the authorities for acreage
set-asides of these commodities, installing instead
a seven-year declining schedule of lump-sum pay-
ments.  The political response to low commodity
prices in 1998 and 1999, however, has changed
this picture fundamentally.  In 1999, without hear-
ings, debate, or visible opposition in either the House
or Senate, Congress passed a supplemental appro-
priation of $8.7 billion (doubling the Agricultural
Market Transition Act payments scheduled, plus
more for crop disaster areas).  President Clinton
approved this legislation while expressing reserva-
tions that it did not adequately restore the safety
net that the 1996 Act allegedly removed.3 Also, in
1999, import restrictions on lamb were introduced,
which arguably are as distortionary as the Wool Act
was.  The abjuration of set-asides is the only impor-
tant 1996 reform that remains in place—and I
would not minimize the importance of this because
set-asides were the most economically wasteful of
the pre-1996 commodity programs.  Nonetheless,
in the case of the United States, I would not say the
changes are slow but fundamental.  Slow, and pos-
sibly transient, is a better characterization.
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Figure 3
U.S. Agricultural Exports and Imports,
















































1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Agriculture as Percent



































1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
SOURCE:  USDA
3 “Allegedly” because the 1996 Act left in place “loan deﬁciency payments”
that were anticipated to cost little or nothing in 1996 (because the safety
net was triggered by prices lower than the baselines of USDA or Con-
gressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO), resulting in about $6 billion in payments
during 1999—over and above Agricultural Market Transition Act (AMTA)
payments.76 JULY/AUGUST 2000
REVIEW